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Abstract. Public policy is increasingly informed by insights from the 
behavioural sciences. We highlight three aspects of behavioural public 
policy which can be incompatible with democratic ethics. First, policy-
makers can use behavioural instruments such as nudges to steer citizens’ 
behaviour without giving reasons and by relying on non-participatory 
research methods. Second, behavioural public policy is frequently 
implemented in the form of administrative discretion by organisations 
which are not under direct democratic control. Third, behavioural public 
policy currently relies on a partial and narrow view of the behavioural 
sciences and is inattentive about value judgements already embedded in the 
research it draws upon. 
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What is behavioural public policy? 
Insights from the behavioural sciences, such as cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics, are currently reshaping much of public policy around the world. 
Behavioural approaches are drawn upon in a variety of policy fields, such as in health 
and environmental policy, labour regulations, and consumer protection law. The first 
nudge unit, the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), was established in 2010 under David 
Cameron’s coalition government in the UK within the cabinet office. It has since 
become a quasi-privatised company (“Behavioural Insights Limited”) with more than 
150 employees that consults and tests policy innovations for the UK government and 
abroad. The BIT serves as a model for many other behavioural insights teams 
worldwide: in the US, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Japan, and 
Singapore, which all have recently created nudge units. Similar behavioural policy units 
can be found at the World Bank and at different teams within the United Nations, at the 
OECD, and the European Commission (Joint Research Centre). A peak point in 
behavioural sciences applied to policy was reached when President Obama issued, in 
2016, an executive order entitled “Behavioral Science Insights Policy Directive” (EO 
13707 2015) that aimed at developing ‘strategies for applying behavioural science 
insights to programs and, where possible, [to] rigorously test and evaluate the impact of 
these insights’. Shortly before, the White House had created a Social and Behavioral 
Sciences Team (SBST), which was influenced by the tenure of Cass Sunstein as head of 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs during the Obama administration. The 
take-up of psychological insights by public actors is noteworthy as it often presents a 
far-reaching change from the status quo of the contemporary design, formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of policy (Halpern 2016). 
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The first normative defence of behavioural public policy (BPP) was spelled out in the 
writings on libertarian paternalism (Thaler & Sunstein 2003) and in Nudge (Thaler & 
Sunstein 2008). Ethicists of public policy have, for now more than a decade, 
meticulously engaged with the framework formulated by Thaler and Sunstein, creating 
a large and sprawling literature, which we would like to divide into “general 
philosophical”, “topical”, and “discipline-specific” bodies of work. Most general 
philosophical treatments can be found within moral and political philosophy (Hausman 
& Welch 2010; Wilkinson 2013). For instance, the defensibility of libertarian 
paternalism has been called into question (Mitchell 2004; Rebonato 2012), while 
conceptual debates have sought to define nudging (Saghai 2013; Hansen 2016) and 
related notions such as choice architecture (Vallier 2016). At the same time, distinct 
topical discussions about the ethics of nudging have emerged independently from within 
fields in which nudges have been applied. Examples include debates in sub-fields such 
as public health (Ménard 2010) and bioethics (e.g., in clinical contexts when discussing 
nudging by physicians, see Cohen 2013; Gorin et al. 2017), ethics of artificial 
intelligence and big data (Helbing et al. 2017; Yeung 2017), environmental nudges 
(Schubert 2017b ), and charitable giving (Hobbs 2017) and development (Berndt 2015). 
Here, debates are specific to the field of application and rarely discuss the ethics of 
nudging across fields in general terms. 
In addition to general and topical debates about the ethics of nudging, we find 
reflections about the theoretical and methodological compatibility of behavioural 
approaches for a given scientific discipline. Examples include debates in law and legal 
theory (Alemanno & Sibony 2015; Kemmerer et al. 2016), economic methodology and 
welfare economic theory (Sugden 2017; Whitman & Rizzo 2015), development studies 
(Reddy 2012), health policy (Quigley 2013), cognitive and social psychology 
(Gigerenzer 2015; Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff 2017), and marketing (French 2011; Chriss 
2015). The discipline-specific body of literature about the ethics of nudging shows that 
not just policy but also the social sciences are being ‘behaviouralised’ as experimental 
methodology and behavioural insights are spreading throughout academia (Małecka & 
Lepenies 2018). 
Yet, the contributions mentioned earlier mostly take Thaler and Sunstein’s framework 
and concepts not just as the starting point but also as the end point of their engagement. 
The current debate on ethics of nudging is focused on defending or criticising this initial 
theoretical framework. 
We here want to argue that ethicists of public policy must look elsewhere in the future: 
they should ask how public policy is actually undertaken – that is, how behavioural 
policy is institutionalised and argued for in practice, and – being aware of its intellectual 
origins and context – begin to reflect on the justification of behavioural interventions if 
these are to become more widespread. It is helpful in this regard for ethicists of public 
policy to take note of incipient research on BPP (whether in the sociology of BPP or in 
the epistemology and intellectual history of the behavioural sciences).1 We will focus 
on three aspects of BPP – namely, the instruments it uses, the organisational forms it 
involves, and the view on (behavioural) science it presumes. BPP poses different 
problems in democracies: it is hard to make it compatible with deliberative and 
participatory approaches in research and implementation, it often relies on instruments 
that impact the behaviour of citizens without necessarily relying on reason-giving, and 
40 The ethics of behavioural public policy 
 
it instrumentalises science for practical use, potentially eroding public trust in science 
and scientists. 
The chapter is structured as follows: We begin by contrasting behavioural public 
policy with evidence-based policy-making, describing the former as an increasingly 
institutionalised policy movement. Then, we describe how behavioural public policy 
invokes “science” while justifying behavioural interventions. We then consider the 
challenges to democratic ethics posed by behavioural policy instruments, behavioural 
organisations, and its relation to science before concluding. 
Behavioural public policy and evidence-based policymaking 
The phenomenon of behavioural public policy is closely related, though not identical, 
with that of evidence-based policymaking (EBPM), which is an approach to policy 
broadly encouraging a principled grounding of its decisions on the best available 
scientific evidence. BPP, like EBPM, aims to ground policy design, its formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation on scientific insights. BPP restricts these to scientific 
insights about human behaviour won from the “behavioural sciences”, whereas EBPM 
is not limited to scientific insights stemming from a specific domain or set of scholarly 
approaches. Both BPP and EBPM accept the ‘specific hierarchy of scientific methods, 
with randomised control trials (RCTs) and meta-analysis/the systematic review of RCTs 
(published in high-status peer-reviewed journals) at the top’ (Cairney 2016: 3). In 
practice, this is expressed particularly in the endorsement of experimental methodology 
(especially through RCTs) and meta-studies.2 
What matters to us here is that EBPM is most commonly described as a ‘vague, 
aspirational term, rather than a good description of the policy process’ (Cairney 2016: 
1). This distinguishes BPP, which represents both a novel intellectual approach to policy 
and a policy movement with increasingly well-defined contours. For a good example of 
this behavioural proposition, see the call for bridging the ‘divide between behavioral 
science & policy’ in Fox and Sitkin (2015). Proponents of BPP aim to change the way 
in which academic scholars influence policy, and understand themselves as a ‘growing 
movement among social scientists and leaders within the public and private sector, 
dedicated to grounding important decisions in strong scientific evidence’ (Behavioral 
Science & Policy Association 2017). 
BPP is increasingly institutionalised, networked, and embedded in governance 
practices: it has become a policy movement. Studies of networks of behavioural change 
agents show the spread of a transnational network of BPP proponents with a distinct 
rhetoric, journals, and associations alongside and beyond new governmental “nudge 
units” that are created around the world (Jones et al. 2013; Pykett et al. 2016; Strassheim 
& Korinek 2016; Whitehead et al. 2014). With varying zeal, entrepreneurial proponents 
of behavioural policy push towards bringing behavioural insights to policy (John 2014), 
making sophisticated calculations comparing the relative effectiveness of behavioural 
instruments to alternative policy measures (Benartzi et al. 2017).3 While doing so, 
traditional (non-behavioural) approaches to policy are commonly labelled as not being 
rigorous enough. Hence, it has become a frequent strategy for behavioural insights 
teams to quantify and monetise their achievements in terms of how the application of 
the behavioural scientific findings leads to tax dollars saved, pollution avoided, 
accidents prevented, lives saved, and happiness increased. Indeed, using behavioural 
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science is defended as a moral imperative. As one of the leading behavioural analysts 
of the French prime minister’s Centre for Strategic Analysis argued, ‘No one would 
accept that a new drug would be developed only by economists and lawyers and 
launched without the proper trials. We should not tolerate this in policy-making either’ 
(Oullier 2013: 463). Because of these normative assumptions of BPP, ethical reflection 
is needed. 
Intellectual underpinnings of behavioural public policy 
All key behavioural publication outlets are keen on discussing the ethics of behavioural 
policy, with frequent invitations to ethicists and applied moral philosophers to comment 
(in addition to frequent inclusion of such perspectives at behavioural conferences). On 
the key tenet, however, proponents of behavioural public policy are not swayed: the 
consensus is that choice architecture is inevitable; there is no way not to nudge. For 
example, Sunstein argues,  
It is pointless to raise ethical objections to nudges and choice architecture. [. . .] No 
government can avoid some kind of choice architecture. We can object to particular 
nudges, and particular goals of particular choice architects, but not to nudging in 
general [. . .] government is nudging even if it does not want to do so. 
(Sunstein 2016: 15–16) 
Indeed, in the “age of the behavioral sciences” (the title of Sunstein 2016) it would be 
irresponsible not to use science for the greater societal good. 
Yet, little has been said about what it means that policy is informed by the 
“behavioural sciences”. What counts as a behavioural science in this movement? BPP 
is drawing on a specific subset of disciplines that has historically included some but not 
other strands of understanding human behaviour (Heukelom 2014; Thaler 2015). BPP 
is consciously interdisciplinary, but selectively so (Lepenies & Małecka forthcoming). 
Put a bit provocatively, BPP itself has a selective science bias. Only certain approaches 
are being received that share the methods and styles of inquiry of BPP: those that heavily 
draw on behavioural economics (which itself developed out of cognitive psychology – 
e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1975 or Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and use experimental 
methodology (see Małecka & Nagatsu forthcoming on the variety of approaches within 
the behavioural sciences). BPP is almost entirely influenced by a specific strand of study 
of human behaviour (cognitive psychology with experimental evidence, but not, for 
example, evolutionary psychology), but there is no real pluralism in the types of 
psychology that BPP draws upon. The relationship between BPP in practice and other 
disciplinary approaches is hence what we could describe as one of select 
interdisciplinarity. This select interdisciplinarity does not acknowledge considerable 
diversity within the contributing disciplines in advocacy of behavioural applications. 
From “nudge” to behavioural practice 
The lesson to draw from this is that ethicists of public policy should be aware that 
behavioural public policy comes with novel claims about what behavioural sciences are 
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and what they are for; it also comes with (implicit) claims about the role of science in 
policy, together with novel institutional configurations (nudge units) and organisational 
interests that bring these changes about. Therefore, for ethicists to make adjudications 
on behavioural policy, it is necessary to understand the empirical reality of the practice 
they want to evaluate. Informed by this approach, we highlight three sets of challenges 
BPP poses in democracies through the specific (1) instruments it uses, the (2) 
organisational forms it involves, and the (3) values that scientific behavioural research 
is permeated with.4 These facets are not necessary features of BPP but are historically 
grown and therefore contingent features that characterise the currently dominant variant 
of bringing “psychological insights to policy”. 
The purpose here is hence not to claim irreconcilability of behavioural approaches 
with democratic principles on a general level, but to investigate some contingent 
practices insofar as they stand in tension with democratic principles. In the case of 
behavioural instruments, the behaviour of citizens is impacted without policy-makers 
necessarily relying on reason-giving, and by relying on non-participatory research 
methods. In the case of behavioural policy organisations, policy is made in a setting 
that is not under direct democratic control, and administrative interventions have thus 
far preferred administrative interventions over legislative actions. Lastly, regarding 
values embedded in scientific research, BPP’s emphasis on the practical use of 
behavioural scholarship confronts policy-makers with only a partial and narrow view of 
how a science of human behaviour may benefit public policy, which might undercut 
BPP’s ability to provide fora for scrutinising these values in democratic procedures. 
Such an analysis might also be of constructive value, helping policy-makers to make 
behavioural practice more transparent, accountable, and attentive to different inter- and 
intra-disciplinary inputs. 
Instruments 
Nudging has become the most prominent example of behavioural public policy as 
articulated by Thaler and Sunstein in their best-seller Nudge (2008). Nudges are gentle 
non-coercive policy solutions, explicitly justified by the normative framework of 
libertarian paternalism: they are social interventions that are choice-preserving but 
welfare enhancing for individual citizens and can be applied in a range of policy fields.  
A nudge [. . .] is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour 
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a 
nudge. Banning junk food does not. 
(Thaler & Sunstein 2008: 6) 
Sunstein is covering many responses to critics of these debates in subsequent works 
(2015a; 2015b), most recently in his The Ethics of Influence (2016). Here, he carefully 
defends nudges on a variety of ethical grounds (from traditional “perspectives” of 
autonomy, self-government, dignity), and in particular, welfarist perspectives. Each of 
these defences has been challenged. Our focus here will lay on instrument-specific 
issues that are less often discussed. Nudges are difficult to capture with traditional 
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typologies of policy instruments (Howlett 1991; Vedung 1998; Loer (forthcoming)). 
Some have claimed that especially those nudges which have non-cognitive 
characteristics are unlike other instruments of command and control, incentives or 
information and persuasion. Here, some nudges violate a criterion of democratic 
publicity: how can a polity endorse instruments that “work in the dark”, and which 
citizens are not aware of (Hausman & Welch 2010)? More problematically, does a 
widespread application of behavioural policy not undercut reason-giving in 
democracies, as behaviour is impacted based on knowledge about behavioural 
regularities, but not through normative argumentation (Lepenies & Małecka 2015)? 
Proponents have attempted to counter these worries by pointing to empirical acceptance 
of nudges (Reisch et al. 2017) or by saying that public nudge-for-good might be 
necessary to counterbalance corporate nudges-for-bad (see Schmidt 2017) or by arguing 
that some nudges are trivially uncontroversial (e.g., simplified tax forms). 
Proponents usually endorse, implicitly or explicitly, a welfarist stance. 
Correspondingly, nudge units argue they have positive social impact and that they 
“nudge for good”. We feel, however, that this focus on nudges misses the point: 
behavioural practice has moved on. When new behavioural units are being set up today, 
it is not libertarian paternalist principles that are invoked, but rather, it is the discourse 
of a more scientifically oriented approach to policy that is being used (which means, at 
times, more “realistic”, “rigorous”, “evidence-based”). Behavioural instruments are 
now not primarily offered via a normative defence (freedom-of-choice-preserving, non-
coercive) or an economical one (cheap) but through a scientific one. Shafir, in the 
introduction to the landmark Behavioural Foundations of Public Policy Handbook, 
writes that  
a rich body of research conducted over the past three to four decades [ . . . ] has 
changed the way we understand people [ . . . ] our new understanding, this new view 
of the human agent, might help design and implement better public policy. 
(Shafir 2012: 9, our emphasis) 
Behavioural reports by nudge units frequently play down the role of nudges as 
representing only one behavioural instrument among many (Sousa Lourenço 2016), and 
that “behavioural science” provides insights beyond the normative frame of libertarian 
paternalism. Rather than looking at one new instrument (nudge), behavioural policy 
crucially alters the way that tools are selected compared to alternative policy 
approaches. Behavioural policy tools differ from traditional policy tools (carrots, sticks, 
sermons: material incentives, command-and-control measures, persuasive techniques) 
not because of their inherent characteristics but because of the procedures that have 
brought them into the policy process. In the case of behavioural instruments, they were 
chosen as part of an experimental methodology and their presumed effectiveness in 
changing citizens’ behaviour alone. 
For ethicists of public policy, this means entering new territory, as behavioural policy 
reorders the ways in which tools are being selected. Effectiveness alone matters for tool 
selection, which means that tool-intrinsic qualities are not considered as relevant by 
policy-makers anymore (e.g., it makes no normative difference for proponents whether 
a ban, tax, or psychological cue is getting people to smoke less, where in the past, 
aspects other than effectiveness played a role in tool selection). However, the focus on 
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effectiveness simplifies the purpose of such instruments to only one dimension – the 
impact on citizens’ behaviour. 
Organisational forms 
Today, there are BPP proponents working on issues from ‘behavioral finance, labor 
contracts, philanthropy, and the analysis of savings and poverty, to eyewitness 
identification and sentencing decisions, racism, sexism, health behaviours, and voting, 
health, environment, and nutrition, to dispute resolution, implicit racism, and false 
convictions’ (Shafir 2012: 1). The portfolio of nudge units mirrors this broad range of 
topics. Take the most prominent example of the Behavioural Insights Team, which to 
date has published hundreds of behavioural trials in the UK and abroad. These trials are 
not done in secret: the BIT is extraordinarily transparent in its policy work as it brings 
norms of academia into policy. This is true for many larger behavioural insights teams, 
where trials are pre-registered, null findings are reported, and there is a close 
cooperation with academic institutions as well as in transdisciplinary projects with 
NGOs or private companies. In addition, BPP engages openly with their own 
“behavioural failures”, as will be pointed out ahead. Yet, other aspects of BPP are 
considerably less transparent: how, for example, do nudge units choose their areas of 
engagement? Behavioural policy units in different countries seem to prioritise quite 
differently here, choosing different organisational forms (centralised, networked; 
bottom-up or top-down; academic or administration-driven). They range from Danish 
grassroots organisation INudgeYou to purely governmental units in Germany 
(Projektgruppe “Wirksam Regieren”) or Japan, to policy initiatives at the international, 
local, or regional level. The most influential team, the UK BIT, was actually semi-
privatised and became a so-called social purpose organisation, with several offices 
around the world. Others went from a higher involvement of private actors in looser 
networks to a more public status (Nudge France), or went from being federally 
organised (SBST in the US) to a more decentralised format (behavioural projects at the 
Department of Defense, as well as on municipal and city level). At the same time, new 
behavioural consultancies are being created in the private sector (e.g., at Nestle, 
Deloitte, Ogilvy). 
Yet some organisational forms are more problematic than others. How legitimate is it 
for behavioural public policy to become a private consulting service? Should 
behavioural policy units be as public as possible in terms of ownership structure? We 
think that publicly owned nudge units enable them better to fend off exploitative 
commercial behavioural practices (“counter-nudges”). An important question going 
forward here is to figure out which organisational form best accommodates a variety of 
voices (from different scientific fields and beyond) in behavioural policy practice. 
This becomes particularly pressing as BPP units develop their own political economy 
(Schubert 2017a): teams face resistance from within government and from industry and 
corporate lobby groups, and constantly have to persuasively present their findings in 
order to gain political credibility. In practice, this has turned behavioural units into 
political and strategic actors themselves that have to balance accountability and 
institutional survival. Fox and Sitkin (2015: 5), for example, argue for the need to ‘learn 
several lessons from the unrivaled success of economists in influencing policy. We 
highlight three: Communicate simply, field test and quantify results, and occupy 
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positions of influence’. This shows, in accordance with predictions from organisational 
theory in political science, that once behavioural institutions exist, they need a reason 
to sustain themselves. As mentioned earlier, BPP constitutes a transnational movement 
to renew policy (Pykett et al. 2016; Jones et al. 2013), where this institutionalisation is 
coordinated and strategic.5 
BPP requires a high level of expertise. Here, convincing sociological explanations of 
the importance of individual proponents of BPP have been put forward (John 2014; 
Strassheim et al. 2015; Strassheim & Korinek 2016).6 These individuals are often a 
hybrid of researchers and policy-makers themselves. Maybe, in the case of BPP, we 
should cease to speak dichotomously about policy-makers, policy-takers, and scientists 
somewhat on the outside. Cairney (2016) suggests usage of the term “policy 
community” to denote that decisions about policy are made by those who influence 
informally, and those who bear formal responsibility. In the case of BPP, what is also 
novel is the direction in which “behavioural knowledge” is travelling in the policy 
community. It is not just from established findings into practice, but just as often, 
knowledge is co-produced not because policy-makers and behavioural scientists are 
participating but because members of nudge units are frequently researchers and policy-
makers at the same time who have acquired “behavioural expertise” (as Strassheim and 
Korinek call it), as well as strategic knowledge about policy processes. 
General questions on the place of experts in democracies have been well rehearsed 
elsewhere (Fischer 2009). Yet, there is at least one additional challenge when relying on 
behavioural experts in democracies that is posed by the involvement of highly 
specialised experts (so-called choice architects or planners) in organisations that are 
capable of translating findings from the behavioural sciences to policy. For behavioural 
insights to be applied, at the beginning, there is the diagnosis of a policy problem. In 
the case of BPP, this usually involves identifying stable cognitive biases in the target 
population and counteracting them through behavioural interventions (which could be 
heuristics-triggering or heuristics-blocking interventions). By doing this, however, 
experts necessarily have to endorse a view of what the target population would 
reasonably want if they were free from the cognitive bias that experts have diagnosed.7 
Here, behavioural expert opinion is used to diagnose behavioural biases in the target 
population and implements remedies without necessarily using deliberative fora of 
democratic institutions of collective will formation. Instead, nudge units act by 
attempting to identify the “real” but hidden preferences of citizens when choosing 
interventions. This is hotly debated in economic methodology (Sugden 2017). But the 
practical challenge is put by the existence of nudge units directly: how can behavioural 
experts influence policy without forestalling democratic procedures of collective will 
formation? There have always been ethical challenges of experts (see Philip Tetlock’s 
2017 critique of political expertise, on epistemic democracy in the ‘good judgment’ 
project), and there has always been the technocratic critique of the idea of engineering 
good societies, but what is new here is the institutionalised form of bringing like-minded 
experts together in well-structured organisations that reference, and draw authority 
from, a new influential science of human behaviour. Our hypothesis is that proponents 
of BPP are not merely recipients of findings from an established body (“the” behavioural 
sciences) but rather the first actively to bring into existence new research in the 
behavioural sciences (e.g., through studies set up by nudge units) and therefore both 
recipients and participants in the scientific endeavour they draw upon, and draw 
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legitimation from a field that they partially create themselves through the design of 
experiments, tests of new interventions, and new policy ventures. By invoking (self-
created) behavioural science as a justification, practitioners thereby assume political 
and epistemic authority to be one and the same thing. 
With unconventional policy tools at their disposal, systematic preference of 
administrative discretion rather than legislative action, and without full democratic 
control and oversight, politicised behavioural insights teams may unduly8 blur the 
borders between politics, policy, and science. 
Values in behavioural research 
We have seen how the attempt to bring the behavioural sciences to policy finds specific 
contours as it moves from theory to practice. The idea of using knowledge about the 
regularities and tendencies of human behaviour to make policies effective (i.e., to bring 
about desired effects) presumes a rather simplified view of science (in this case, the 
behavioural sciences) as a repository of facts or findings that are then being applied in 
the practical context (see Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler 1998; Shafir 2012; Sunstein 1997). An 
important insight from the contemporary discussions in the philosophy of science is that 
political, social, and ethical values cannot be kept separate from the processes of 
knowledge production, and interfere with what makes (behavioural) knowledge reliable 
and, as such, suitable as a basis of policy applications (Douglas 2009). Proponents of 
BPP have not yet discussed what this could mean for their project.9 
Values have an indispensable role in scientific research (Douglas 2009; Longino 
1990; Kourany 2010; Wylie & Nelson 2007; Solomon 2001). Once we recognise and 
acknowledge this role, we quickly see that the relationship between behavioural 
findings and their practical use in the policy contexts is complex. Values are entering 
the very process of producing knowledge within the behavioural sciences already; they 
do not appear only at the stage of applying this knowledge outside science – that is, in 
policy. It is perceived as relatively uncontroversial to state that non-epistemic values, 
such as normative and emotive commitments that concern moral and social life, can 
influence the choice of topics and of goals that research is expected to serve. The real 
challenge arises with the question whether there is any type of influence of these values 
on the acceptance of hypotheses and theories. As scientists have to decide whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support a claim/hypothesis, non-epistemic values are a 
necessary part of hypothesis testing and theory choice – particularly in the behavioural 
and social sciences. They help in assessing the consequences of making a mistake while 
making judgements about the evidential support for a hypothesis (Rudner 1953). 
Furthermore, in order to assess the evidential warrant of a hypothesis, scientists have to 
decide what kind of evidence is relevant for the hypothesis – at least in some cases this 
decision can be value-laden (Longino 1990). Longino also points out that moral and 
social values are allowed to enter into decisions concerning the background assumptions 
of scientific reasoning (Longino 1990). 
Generally, it is believed that the best the scientific community can do is to make 
values explicit and to work out the procedures and approaches for discussing them 
(Longino 1990, Longino 2002). This, of course, is difficult to achieve with BPP as it is 
not directly a subject of democratic control in its current state. This is complicated 
through the use of experimental methodology in all nudge units around the world: 
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choice architects have biases – this much behavioural proponents recognise. But citizens 
themselves, who are partaking in experiments, cannot be choice architects at the same 
time.10 
When confronted with the question of what should follow from the realisation that 
values infuse scientific practice, one common suggestion is to democratise science. The 
proposal here is that the public receives the chance to legitimately contest (1) the 
direction of scientific research effort, (2) the legitimacy and acceptability of expertise, 
and (3) the institutional structures for science (public assessment of research agendas, 
of expertise, of science’s institutions) (Douglas 2009). Currently, BPP does not offer 
democratised structures on any of these three aspects. 
What does the foregoing discussion mean specifically in the context of BPP? 
Behavioural scientists, as all scientists, are also making inferences in the face of 
uncertainty. Therefore, while making judgements about which evidence is sufficient for 
supporting or rejecting a hypothesis, behavioural scientists rely on values when it comes 
to reasoning about possible consequences of making false positive or false negative 
errors. 
Furthermore, in a paper that has not thus far attracted attention of the field, Lacey 
argues that behavioural scientists are making value judgements when deciding ‘which 
strategy to adopt’ (Lacey 2003:209). Lacey claims that value judgements have an 
indispensable role during the ‘adoption of strategy’ during the research process. 
Adoption of strategy means to ‘constrain the kinds of theories (hypotheses, regularities) 
that might be entertained in a given domain of inquiry, thus to specify the kinds of 
possibilities that may be explored in the course of the inquiry’ Lacey (2003: 212). 
Gaining empirical knowledge depends on the strategy scientists adopt, which means 
that the type of strategy chosen influences what phenomena scientists gain empirical 
knowledge of. Lacey argues that the involvement of values during the adoption of 
strategy is especially important in the behavioural and cognitive sciences. 
In the behavioural and cognitive sciences scientists confront the choice of adopting, 
for instance, behaviourist, cognitivist, or sociobiological strategies. The behaviourist 
strategy constrains hypotheses to those that concern lawful relations between 
behaviours and environments, whereas the cognitivist strategy does so to those that 
concern representations of mental structures and computational accounts of mental 
processes. Lacey points out that ‘radical behaviorist approaches are partly motivated by 
the value of furthering our capability to exercise control over human behaviour, and 
some cognitive psychology approaches are motivated partly by highlighting the values 
of rationality and freedom’ (p. 219). He argues for a pluralism of strategies employed 
within the behavioural sciences and claims that attempts to extrapolate and generalise 
one strategy, for instance, in a form like ‘all behavior is explicable in terms of 
behaviorist categories’, or ‘all mental phenomena are computable’ mean in fact the 
endorsement of metaphysical claims sustained by the fruitfulness in guiding research 
and, thus, by value commitments.11 
We have hypothesised earlier that while BPP is programmatically interdisciplinary in 
its references to the behavioural sciences, it does not allow for such a pluralism as Lacey 
describes. Proponents of BPP claim to rely on a particular body of research within the 
behavioural science, for instance: cognitive psychology and behavioural economics. 
With behavioural trials, they themselves contribute to co-produce this field, while not 
taking into account alternative approaches within the behavioural sciences – for 
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example, the socio-economic studies and social epidemiology or non-mainstream 
psychological schools. Favouring one approach over another can be related, as 
suggested by Lacey, to the practical aim and attempt of controlling behaviour, or 
steering it into more rational directions. 
There are two main lessons to be learnt from understanding the role values play in 
science, and specifically in the behavioural sciences. First, we see that the knowledge 
on the basis of which BPP formulates its policy solution can be value-laden in the sense 
explained and elaborated earlier. Values that enter the behavioural research can 
influence the ways in which this research is being applied to policy. For instance, we 
observe that certain approaches in behavioural sciences become more influential than 
others, which is related to the ways in which epistemic and non-epistemic values and 
interests (e.g., in controlling human behaviour) are entangled.12 Second, BPP is an 
approach to policy that lacks full integration with democratic institutions (parliaments, 
scientific oversight committees) and, as such, poses challenges, or threats, to the 
possibility of a democratic control over behavioural policies. This becomes problematic 
also when we account for the role that values play in the behavioural research. One 
important way of making these values explicit and subject to critical scrutiny is by 
exposing scientific research to public criticism through democratic engagement. 
Scrutinising values embedded in behavioural research can have significant impact on 
the ways in which this research is applied within BPP; it can also allow for more 
diversity of approaches informing BPP. 
Conclusion 
The contemporary phenomenon of behavioural public policy is an innovative and 
increasingly influential approach to public policy which raises unique concerns about 
its compatibility with democratic ideas, processes, and institutions. We survey a 
selection of such problems by analysing the instruments it uses, the organisational forms 
it has brought about, and the role that values play in behavioural research. BPP poses 
different problems in democracies: it is hard to make compatible with deliberative and 
participatory approaches in implementation, it often relies on instruments that impact 
the behaviour of citizens without necessarily relying on reason-giving, and it 
instrumentalises science for practical use which might occasionally undercut its 
reliability as a legitimate source of knowledge. 
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1 We follow here an approach to ethics of public policy which is inductive in the sense that we 
start from empirical observations about changes in the practices of public administration in 
democracies. We have explored an institutionalist perspective on behavioural policy 
elsewhere (Lepenies & Malecka 2015). Here, our approach is similar to Thompson (2005) 
in that we propose to avoid excessive individual framings (“How to nudge for good?”) and 
instead focus on themes of institutional responsibility. Indeed, we think that the value of 
social institutions cannot be appraised by referencing their contribution to the achievement 
of outcomes that have a single dimension (here: effectiveness). Without spelling out an 
account of the intrinsic normativity of (certain) social institutions, we take here the more 
minimal position of arguing against their instrumentalisation. 
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2 For behavioural public policy, see especially how academics and policy-makers collaborated in 
the influential policy report endorsing the “Test, Learn, Adapt” framework (Haynes et al. 
2012). 
3 With impressive results: the automatic savings plan “Save More Tomorrow” by Benartzi and 
Thaler (2013) has boosted retirements savings in the US by more than $7.4 billion annually, 
according to their own calculations. 
4 We must leave out here the fascinating discussion about whether behavioural instruments should 
be used to support democratic processes. Sunstein (2016) discusses examples of how 
behavioural insights might be used to, for example, encourage electoral turnout. 
5 For example, the UK Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) has introduced a mnemonic 
(‘APPLES’) with which it advises international partners on how to best convince policy 
makers to establish nudge units. APPLES stands for: the necessity of networking within 
Administration, support from Politics, well-recruited People, close physical Location to 
sources of power, a culture of scientific Experimentation, proximity to universities and 
other institutions of Scholarship. 
6 ‘[A]gency as well as structure plays an important role in the adoption and diffusion of the ideas 
from the behavioural sciences’ (John 2015). John here notes that critics often assume too 
linear a view of the policy process, and that behavioural ideas and evidence are ‘more 
limited and less uniform’ in their use as commonly assumed. 
7 Sunstein suggests that no ethical problems arise for experts if citizens have clear self-control 
problems, have voiced their preferences beforehand, or can be shown to be ex-post content 
with behavioural interventions (2017). 
8 This relies on a normative view of what these borders ought to be. Our position here is what we 
would call anti-instrumental institutionalism: we generally believe that societal institutions 
(whether law, politics, science, or others) have value independently of their capability to 
achieve a specific outcome (i.e., to be effectively achieving a one-dimensional goal). 
9 This section draws on ideas developed in Lepenies and Małecka (forthcoming). 
10 For an exception, see John et al. (2011) for attempts to complement nudge with participatory 
“think” approaches. 
11 See also Johnson and Orr in this volume. 
12 The interpretation of how disciplinary values might impact policy is contested: Schubert 
(2017a) finds, for example, a systematic bias within regulatory agencies in favour of 
scientific information that seems to support extending regulation. 
 
